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Summary – In this paper the application of Artificial 
Intelligence to on-line dynamic security assessment of 
isolated power systems with increased wind power 
penetration is presented. The developed security 
functions have been integrated in the dynamic security 
assessment module of the advanced control system of 
the island of Crete providing timely warning of insecure 
operating conditions with very satisfactory accuracy. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In isolated power systems, like the ones operating in 
large islands, electric power is usually produced by 
Diesel Units and Gas Turbines, resulting in high costs 
due to fuel imports and transportation. In these systems 
the production of electric energy from wind presents 
particular interest, especially when important wind 
energy potential exists. Significant displacement of 
conventional fuels can therefore be obtained by a high 
wind power penetration. In this case however, it is 
important to ensure that the power system operation will 
not be adversely affected by an increased connection of 
this volatile form of energy in the system.  
 
In general, the main problems faced by isolated 
electrical power systems are related to system security, 
control of frequency and management of system 
generation reserve [1]. A common aspect to all these 
problems  is  the  requirement  to ensure that  sufficient 
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reserve capacity exists within the system to compensate 
for sudden loss of generation at adequate speed.  Thus, 
mismatches in generation and load and/or unstable 
system frequency control might lead to system failures. 
The introduction of a high penetration from wind energy 
causes additional difficulties, i.e. fast wind power 
changes and very high wind speeds resulting in sudden 
loss of wind generator production can cause frequency 
excursions and dynamically unstable situations. 
Moreover, frequency oscillations might easily trigger the 
under-frequency protection relays of the wind parks, 
thus causing further imbalance in the system 
generation/load. 
 
In order to guard isolated power systems against these 
disturbances and retain acceptable security levels, on-
line dynamic security assessment functions need to be 
provided. Such functions have been developed within 
the European JOULE project CARE and have been 
integrated within an advanced control system installed 
on the island of Crete in Greece [2]. In this system, 
dynamic security assessment (DSA) is taken care of by a 
number of modules based on advanced inductive 
inference and statistical methods as well as artificial 
neural networks.  More specifically, Decision Trees and 
Regression Trees are used for dynamic security 
classification, while Kernel Regression Trees and 
Neural Networks emulate the degree of security, 
evaluated by predicting the expected minimum value of 
system frequency and the maximum rate of frequency 
change for each selected disturbance. In the control 
center software, the relevant security evaluation 
functions can be activated “on call” by the operator 
providing dynamic security monitoring. Initial valuation 
of these functions has shown that timely and quite 
accurate assessment of frequency deviations, during the 
dynamic disturbances recorded, is provided. 
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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE TECHNIQUES APPLIED TO DYNAMIC SECURITY 
ASSESSMENT OF ISOLATED SYSTEMS WITH HIGH WIND POWER 
PENETRATION 
 2. THE CRETE POWER SYSTEM 
 
The power system of the island of Crete is the largest 
autonomous power system in Greece with the highest 
rate of increase in energy and power demand 
nationwide. Its conventional generation system consists 
of two major power plants with several types of oil-fired 
units. There are 18 thermal generating units with a total 
capacity of 524 MW installed, including 6 Steam Units 
of total capacity 112 MW, 4 Diesel Units with 50 MW, 
7 Gas Turbines with 227,5 MW and one Combined 
Cycle plant with 134,5 MWs. In 1998 the peak load 
exceeded 380 MW, while the lowest load was about 100 
MW. A total of 11 Wind Parks (WPs) with a nominal 
capacity of more than 80 MW are being installed or are 
planned to be installed in the near future. These WPs 
will be located at the eastern part of the island, that 
presents the most favourable wind conditions. As a 
result, in case of faults on some particular lines the 
majority of the wind parks might be disconnected. 
Furthermore, the protections of the WTs might be 
activated in case of frequency variations, decreasing 
additionally the dynamic stability of the system. 
Extensive simulations on the power system model using 
EUROSTAG software have shown that for the most 
common wind power variations, the system remains 
satisfactorily stable, if sufficient spinning reserve is 
provided [3]. On the other hand for various short-
circuits and conventional unit outages, the system 
frequency might undergo fast changes and reach low 
values that can activate load shedding. In any case, the 
dynamic security of the system depends critically on the 
amount of spinning reserve provided by the 
conventional machines and the response of their speed 
governors.  
 
3. CREATION OF LEARNING  & TEST SETS 
The application of Automatic Learning techniques is 
based on previous knowledge about the behavior of the 
system, obtained from a large number of off-line 
dynamic simulations that define a data set. This data set 
is split into a Learning Set (LS), used to derive security 
evaluation structures, and a Test Set (TS) used for 
testing the developed structures. The data set consists of 
a large number of operating points (OPs) each 
characterized by a vector of pre-disturbance steady-state 
variables, called attributes. These can be directly 
measured (powers, voltages etc.) or indirectly calculated 
quantities (wind penetration, spinning reserve etc.).  
For the creation of the data set, the initial OPs are 
obtained by varying randomly the load for each load 
busbar, the wind power for each wind park and the wind 
margin. These variables are assumed to follow normal 
distributions around three operating profiles: 
Low-load with a total load PL =100MW. 
Medium-load with a total load PL =180MW. 
High-load with a total load PL =280MW. 
For each of the 11 load busbars and each of the 4 
aggregate wind parks in operation, a perturbation of 
approximately ±10% is applied around each of the 
above operating profiles. A dispatch algorithm 
approximating actual operating practices followed in the 
control system of Crete is applied next in order to 
complete the pre-disturbance OPs. For a given load PL 
and wind power PW, the total conventional generation PC  
given by 
PC = PL – PW   (1) 
is dispatched to the units in operation, depending on 
their type and their nominal power. This means that the 
Steam Units and the Combined Cycle plant cover the 
base load, while the Gas Turbines mainly supply the 
peak.  
For each of the OPs, a number of disturbances has been 
simulated using EUROSTAG.  Two major disturbances 
have been finally selected after studying extensively the 
behavior of the network. These are: 
a) outage of a major gas turbine 
b) three phase short-circuit at a critical bus near the 
Wind Parks.  
In fact, a unit disconnection is a frequent event and a 
three-phase fault, although rare, is a severe event that 
can occur during stormy conditions. 
For each OP, the minimum value of system frequency 
and the maximum rate of frequency change are 
recorded. Both of these parameters are checked against 
the values that activate the under-frequency relays that 
protect the WPs, and the OPs are then labeled as 
secure/insecure. 
The list of attributes characterizing each OP, includes 
namely: 
• Active and reactive power of all power sources 
(Pci). 
• Spinning reserve of the conventional units (SR). 
• Wind power penetration, expressed as ratio of the 
total wind power to the load of the system (WP). 
• Wind margin, expressed as the ratio of the 
conventional units spinning reserve to the total wind 
power. 
• Active and reactive loads (PL). 
The security criterion exploits the minimum frequency 
of the system after the disturbance, according to the 
following rule: 
If fmin <= 49 Hz then the OP is insecure  
      else it is secure 
Using this approach 2765 acceptable OPs have been 
obtained, which were divided into the LS comprising 
1844 OPs and the TS comprising 921 OPs. In this way, 
the capability of the security structures to evaluate 
correctly the security of unforeseen states can be 
estimated on a more objective basis. 
4. DESIGN OF SECURITY EVALUATION 
STRUCTURES 
4.1 Decision Trees 
The decision tree methodology is a non-parametric 
learning technique able to produce classifiers about a 
given problem in order to deduce information for new 
unobserved cases. The construction of a DT starts at the 
root node with the whole LS of pre-classified OPs. 
These OPs are analysed in order to select the test T that 
splits them “optimally” into a number of most “purified” 
subsets. For the sake of simplicity, a two-class partition 
is considered. The test T is defined as:  
T: Ai < t                  (2) 
where t is the optimal threshold value of the chosen 
attribute Ai.  
The selection of the optimal test is based on maximizing 
the additional information gained through the test. The 
selected test is applied to the LS of the node splitting it 
into two subsets, corresponding to the two successor 
nodes. The optimal splitting rule is applied recursively 
to build the corresponding subtrees. In order to detect if 
one node is terminal, i.e. “sufficiently” class pure, the 
stop splitting rule is used, which checks whether the 
entropy of the node is lower than a present minimum 
value. If it is, the node is declared a leaf, otherwise a test 
T is sought to further split the node. If the node cannot 
be further split in statistically significant way, it is 
termed a deadend, carrying the two class probabilities 
estimated on the basis of the corresponding OPs subset. 
A more detailed technical description of the approach 
followed is described in [4,5]. 
4.2 Kernel Regression Trees 
The Kernel Regression Tree (KRT) is an hybrid 
algorithm that integrates regression trees (RT) with 
kernel regression (KR), dealing with continuous goal 
variables (i.e. regression problems). Like in decision 
trees, the design of a RT consists in the extraction of 
interpretable security rules. The regression problem 
consists on obtaining a functional model that relates the 
output y with the inputs a1, a2, ...,an (OP attributes), 
where the output y (denominate as goal variable) is a 
numerical value of the  security index of the system, i.e. 
the minimum frequency - fmin (Hz).  
Building the RT 
The learning of a RT consists on the decomposition of 
the LS into disjoint regions where the severity/security 
of a disturbance (y value) is as constant as possible. The 
splitting rule of a node is defined by a dichotomic test, 
as described in (2), specified so as to minimize the MSE 
(Mean Squared Error) of the security index (y). The 
procedure continues splitting the created successor 
nodes, until it is not possible to reduce the MSE further 
in a statistically significant way or the variance has been 
sufficiently reduced. Finally, to avoid overfitting 
problems a pruning algorithm is applied. A more 
detailed description of the method can be found in [6]. 
Deriving Kernel regressors 
Given a new operating point Q, a prediction for its 
security index, y(Q), can be obtained by applying a 
regression model to the learning samples stored in the 
RT leaf that verifies the Q operating conditions. Kernel 
Regression models provide prediction by a weighted 
average of the response y (fmin in our case) of the form: 
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where )D(Q,OPi - normalized distance function 
measured in the attributes hyper-space; h - bandwidth 
value; [ ] [ ]h/xKxK h = , (.)K  is the Kernel function. The 
prediction is obtained using the samples (also 
denominated by neighbors) that are "most similar" to Q, 
being this similarity measured by the distance function. 
The Kernel function estimates the weight of each 
neighbor, giving more weight to neighbors that are 
nearest to Q. To a more detailed description of the 
applied KRT approach see [9]. 
4.3 Artificial Neural Networks 
Two multi-layer ANNs were trained (one for each 
disturbance) using an adaptive back propagation 
algorithm described in [7]. For the two ANNs the 
following structure was selected (Figure 1) one input 
layer with 22 attributes as inputs, one hidden layer with 
8 neurons and one output layer with the two security 
indices as outputs.  
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Figure 1 – Structure selected for training the ANNs 
 
5. NUMERICAL RESULTS 
Regarding the security classification approaches, the 
performance is evaluated by the following indices: 
global classification error, false alarm and missed alarm 
errors, relatively to a priori classes. For the security 
prediction, mismatches relatively to the target output 
values y, in this case the minimum frequency – fmin are 
quantified by the mean absolute error and the mean 
square error. These performance evaluation indices for 
the short-circuit disturbance are shown in the following 
tables. 
Figures 2 and 3 describe the DT and RT designed for 
the short-circuit disturbance. In these figures, the total 
number of operating points in the learning set belonging 
to each node are presented aside the node number. The 
contents of the box representing each node are 
respectively: 
• For DT - the ratio of the secure operating points 
over the total number of LS OPs belonging to the 
node and the splitting test for non terminal nodes; 
Terminal nodes with a safety ratio larger than 0,5 
correspond to mostly secure nodes; 
• For RT – the mean value and the variance of the 
security index (Hz) regarding the OPs belonging to 
that node (for terminal nodes); For non-terminal 
nodes the splitting test is included. 
 
Table 2. – Performance evaluation of the DTs 
Decision Tree – Disturbance ( Short-Circuit ) 
Classification Performance Evaluation 
Global Error 2.17% 
False Alarm 1.87% 
Missed Alarm 2.58% 
Table 3. –Performance evaluation of the KRTs 
Kernel Regress. Tree – Dist. (Short-Circuit) 
Classification Performance Evaluation 
Global Error 2,39% 
False Alarm 1,83% 
Missed Alarm 3,20% 
Numerical Performance Evaluation 
 Mean Absolute Error 0,0289 
Root Mean Squared Error 0,1127 
Table 4. –Performance evaluation of the NNs 
Kernel Regress. Tree – Dist. (Short-Circuit) 
Classification Performance Evaluation 
Global Error 3,80% 
False Alarm 4,40% 
Missed Alarm 2,93% 
Numerical Performance Evaluation 
 Mean Absolute Error 0,0330 
Root Mean Squared Error 0,0654 
 
In Regression Trees one can assign a given degree of 
security to each leaf according to the mean value of the 
OPs that belong to the node. Tables 3 and 4 enable to 
compare the performance of ANNs and KRT in 
classification and prediction of security for the 
considered disturbance. Extensive results from the 
application of these procedures in the Crete network can 
be found in [8]. 
From the results obtained with the three approaches one 
can derive the following conclusions: 
• When used for security classification all 3 
approaches lead to small classification errors. 
• KRTs have the advantage of producing 
simultaneously a classification structure and giving 
the degree of robustness of the system through the 
predicted value of fmin; KRT can still provide 
interpretable classification and regression rules. 
• All the security evaluation structures are able to 
provide information on the system security in a very 
fast way. 
• The DTs present, in general, simpler classification 
structures, which makes easier any interpretation of 
the phenomena and the identification of the 
influence of the relevant parameters. 
6. IMPLEMENTATION 
The CARE software comprises various modules for 
short-term load and wind power forecasting, unit 
commitment, economic dispatch and on-line security 
assessment oriented to the needs of isolated power 
systems with increased renewable power penetration [8]. 
The security evaluation structures described in Section 4 
were integrated as modules, activated “on call” by the 
operators. In the execution cycle, security assessment 
follows the unit commitment and dispatch modules, 
leaving to the operator the decision to activate the 
module for validation of the proposed dispatch scenario. 
In Figure 4 the Dynamic Security Assessment module, 
as implemented in the EMS of Crete, is shown. Results 
for 48 hours ahead are displayed in the form of lines that 
represent the frequency that is expected in case of the 
considered disturbances under the predicted load 
demand and wind power production, also displayed in 
the same diagram. In this case the maximum frequency 
deviation appears within the specified security limits for 
both disturbances. 
 
 
Figure 4. Man-Machine Interface of the Dynamic 
Security Assessment Module. 
 
 
7. EVALUATION 
 
A pilot installation of CARE has been operating in 
Crete, since May 1999. During this time, wind parks of 
a total installed capacity of 32,5 MW have been 
operating and 27 MW more were at the final stage of 
their installation. During the evaluation period, the mean 
wind power penetration was 4,57% and the peak 
penetration 14,7%. From the beginning of 1999 there 
has been load shedding of 250 MWh, that corresponds 
to the energy of the whole island with middle load for 
one hour. From the beginning of the year, 15 trips of 
conventional units with load shedding, 51 trips of units 
without load shedding and 2 trips of Wind Parks were 
observed. As an example, Figure 4 shows the 
information recorded during the trip of a 17 MW Gas 
Turbine at Chania on the 23rd of June (taking place 
between the 14th and 15th hours). In Table 5 this is 
compared to the security assessment output. 
 
Table 5 – Data for Disturbance of 23rd June 1999. 
 Actual Data 
from SCADA 
CARE Security 
Assessment 
TOTAL PRODUCTION                    329,1 MW 
DISTURBANCE Trip of a 17 
MW Gas 
Turbine with 
small droop 
Trip of a 25 
MW Steam Unit 
with high droop 
FREQUENCY 50.02 Hz to 
49,46 Hz  
49,4 Hz 
 
Figure 5.  Actual Frequency compared to Frequency 
Deviation Assessment  
 
From the above figure it can be seen that the frequency 
drop predicted by the security assessment is very close 
to reality considering the differences in the disturbance 
assumed. It is clear, that enrichment of the security 
structures with more disturbances will provide on-line 
security assessment of very satisfactory accuracy. 
 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The paper describes the application of automatic 
learning techniques to the evaluation of the dynamic 
security of isolated power systems with increased wind 
power penetration. These techniques have been 
integrated in the dynamic security assessment module of 
the advanced control system of the island of Crete, 
helping to identify the operating conditions and 
parameters, namely wind power penetration, that lead to 
a less robust operation of the system. 
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Figure 2 - Decision Tree obtained for the short-circuit disturbance. 
 
Figure 3 – Regression tree obtained for the short-circuit disturbance 
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